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Abstract  
We introduce two new Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are
generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR-) KLJN scheme, uses
random resistors with values chosen from a quasi-continuum set. It is well-known since the creation of the KLJN 
concept that such a system could work in cryptography, because Alice and Bob can calculate the unknown 
resistance value from measurements, but the RR-KLJN system has not been addressed in prior publications since
it was considered impractical. The reason for discussing it now is the second scheme, the Random Resistor Random 
Temperature (RRRT-) KLJN key exchange, inspired by a recent paper of Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl, wherein
security was shown to be maintained at non-zero power flow. In the RRRT-KLJN secure key exchange scheme, 
both the resistances and their temperatures are continuum random variables. We prove that the security of the 
RRRT-KLJN scheme can prevail at a non-zero power flow, and thus the physical law guaranteeing security is not 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics but the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. Alice and Bob know their own 
resistances and temperatures and can calculate the resistance and temperature values at the other end of the 
communication channel from measured voltage, current and power-flow data in the wire. However, Eve cannot 
determine these values because, for her, there are four unknown quantities while she can set up only three
equations. The RRRT-KLJN scheme has several advantages and makes all former attacks on the KLJN scheme
invalid or incomplete.  
Keywords: KLJN key exchange, information theoretic security, unconditional security. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution scheme [1–20] is 
a classical-statistical physical alternative to the quantum key distribution. Fig. 1 depicts a binary 
version of the KLJN scheme and shows that, during a single-bit exchange, the communicating 
parties (Alice and Bob) connect their randomly chosen resistor (including its Johnson noise 
generator) to a wire channel. These resistors are randomly selected from the publicly known set 
{RL, RL}, {RL ≠ RH }, representing the Low (L) and High (H) bit values. The Gaussian voltage 
noise generators ‒ mimicking the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem and delivering band-limited 
white noise with publicly agreed bandwidth ‒ produce enhanced thermal (Johnson) noise at 
a publicly agreed effective temperature Teff, typically Teff  >> 1010K, so that the temperature of 
the wire can be neglected. The noises are statistically independent of each other and from 
the noise of the former bit period.  
In the case of secure bit exchange ‒ i.e., the LH or HL bit situations for Alice and Bob ‒ 
an eavesdropper (Eve) cannot distinguish between these two situations by measuring the noise 
spectra Su(f), Si(f) of voltage and/or current in the cable, respectively, because the LH and HL 
noise levels are identical (degenerated). Thus, when Alice and Bob detect the noise spectra (or 
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noise levels) characteristic of the LH and HL situation, they know that the other party has the 
opposite bit and that this bit is secure. Then one of them will invert the bit (it is publicly pre-
agreed who will do this) to get the same key bit as the other party. The KLJN scheme offers 
unconditional (information theoretic) security at both ideal and slightly non-ideal (i.e., 
practical) conditions [3].  
To avoid a potential information leak by variations in the shape of a probability distribution, 
the noises are Gaussian [1], and it has been proven that other distributions cannot offer perfect 
security [17, 18]. The security against active (invasive) attacks is provided by the robustness of 
classical-physical quantities, which guarantees that they can be continuously monitored and 
exchanged between Alice and Bob via authenticated communication. Therefore the system, and 
the consistency of the measured and exchanged voltage and current data with the known cable 
parameters and model, can be checked continuously and deterministically without destroying 
these data, which is totally different from the case of a quantum key distribution. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The core of the KLJN scheme without defense circuitry [2] against active (invasive) attacks and attacks 
utilizing non-idealities. The RL and RH resistors, identical pairs at Alice and Bob, represent the Low (L) and High 
(H) bit values. The corresponding noise spectra SL and SH also form identical pairs at the two ends, but they belong 
to independent Gaussian stochastic processes. Both parties have the same temperature, and thus the net power flow 
is zero. The LH and HL bit situations of Alice and Bob produce identical voltage and current noise spectra, Su and 
Si, in the wire, implying that they represent a secure bit exchange. The LL and HH bit arrangements, which occur 
in 50% of the cases, have singular noise levels in the wire, and hence they do not offer security because Eve can 
distinguish them. Consequently, 50% of the bits must be discarded. This system works also with arbitrary, non-
binary resistor values as an analog circuitry to exchange continuum information about the distribution of random 
resistors. 
 
We must keep in mind that the KLJN secure information exchanger is basically an analog 
circuit and can work with arbitrary resistances because, even if the resistance values are not 
pre-agreed, Alice can calculate Bob’s resistance from the measured data [1] by using Johnson’s 
formula, and vice versa. For example, by using the measured current spectrum in the wire one 
obtains: 
                                                           B =
eff

− A.                                                         (1) 
It is important to note that Eve is also able to determine an arbitrary, non-pre-agreed (non-
publicly known) resistor pair connected to the line by using measured voltage and current 
spectra [1]. The two solutions of the obtained second order equation provide two resistance 
values of the pair according to: 
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                                                , =
±	

 .                                        (2)  
However, Eve cannot determine which resistor is with Alice and which is with Bob, and 
hence the information exchange about the distribution of arbitrary, non-binary resistor values 
is secure in the original KLJN system. 
 
2. The Vadai-Mingesz-Gingl KLJN scheme 
 
Resistor inaccuracies in the binary KLJN scheme can remove the degeneracy of the LH and 
HL noise levels in the communication line ‒ thus yielding a non-zero information leak ‒ as was 
pointed out long ago [21, 22], and ensuing inaccuracies on the 1-%-level have been considered 
acceptable for practical purposes with minimal privacy amplification and secure bit filtering 
[3]. Recently, Vadai-Mingesz-Gingl (VMG) published a modified KLJN scheme [19] with very 
interesting properties in order to fully eliminate such a leak. We call this the VMG-KLJN 
system. In a subsequent article [20] they showed that the earlier temperature-compensation 
defense principle [16] against wire resistance attacks on the KLJN system can successfully be 
used also for the VMG-KLJN scheme. 
We note, in passing, that the title of VMG’s paper [19] is misleading because it mentions 
“arbitrary” resistors and indicates that the “arbitrariness” of these resistors would constitute the 
main new result of their paper. However, already the original KLJN scheme had “arbitrary” 
resistors, but not a continuum range of resistors with ad hoc random choice, which the VMG-
KLJN scheme also is unable to offer. The truly new aspect of the VMG-KLJN scheme is 
different, namely that Alice and Bob can have two different pairs of fixed resistors consisting 
of, AL , AH, BL and BH which are Alice’s and Bob’s logic L and H resistances, respectively; 
see Fig. 2.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The Vadai-Mingesz-Gingl KLJN scheme. The resistor pairs representing the Low (L) and High (H) bit 
values are different at Alice (A) and Bob (B), and their temperatures and the corresponding noise spectra are 
different, too. Thus, the net power flow is non-zero. The resistance values RAL, RAH, RBL and RBH, as well as 
the temperatures TAL, TAH, TBL and TBH, are pre-determined and thus publicly known. This protocol is not designed 
to work with arbitrary, non-binary resistor values in order to exchange continuum information about 
the distribution of random resistors, because the resistance values and temperatures are interrelated, and Alice and  
             Bob cannot abruptly alter them without requesting a change of the temperature(s) at the other party. 
 
The VMG-KLJN scheme is binary, just as the original KLJN system, and Alice’s and Bob’s 
task is to find conditions under which the voltage and current noise spectra in the wire are 
identical at the HL and LH bit combinations, i.e., for the pairs RAL ‒ RBH  and RAH ‒ RBL. This 
identity cannot be accomplished with uniform temperatures. Starting with the temperature TAL 
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of Alice’s RAL resistor, the other temperatures (TAH, TBL and TBH) are designed so that the LH 
and HL bit situations produce identical voltage and current noise spectra and power-flow in the 
wire, implying that they represent a secure bit exchange. VMG found the necessary temperature 
values [19] in the following generic form:  
                                                       TAH = TALF (RAL, RAH, RBL, RBH),                                     (3) 
                                                       TBL = TALG (RAL, RAH, RBL, RBH)                                      (4) 
and 
                                                       TBH = TALH (RAL, RAH, RBL, RBH).                                     (5) 
The functions F, G and H are deterministic (their explicit forms are published [19] and are 
not reproduced here). Thus Alice and Bob must know not only their own set of resistors but 
also the resistance values at the other side, and Bob must also know Alice’s temperature TAL. 
Consequently, these resistor sets and temperatures are deterministic, which in accordance with 
Kerckhoffs’s principle [23] implies that all of the parameters are known by Eve. (Note that 
“keying” these parameter values by randomly generating and disseminating them via secure 
communication, by using the formerly shared key, is of course possible, just as it is in the case 
of the Keyed-KLJN scheme [5] and some quantum versions [24, 25], but such enhancements 
to make Eve’s job more difficult are not the topic of the present paper).  
The LL and HH bit arrangements, which occur in 50% of the cases, have singular noise levels 
in the wire. Thus they offer no security and must be discarded, so the VMG system does not 
offer any speed-up of the key exchange. 
Concerning practical applications of the original KLJN system in “macroscopic” circuit 
boards or hybrid integrated circuits, the resistor pairs can easily be chosen with high-enough 
precision, and therefore the VMG system is not needed. However, in monolith integrated 
circuits and in the absence of post-processing for trimming of the KLJN resistors, the VMG 
method [19] can be handy to eliminate the information leak due to resistor inaccuracies [21, 
22]. 
It should be emphasized that VMG’s paper [19] contains a very important discovery: that 
unconditional security can be attained at a non-zero power flow, i.e., at non-equilibrium 
conditions! Hence, it is not the Second Law of Thermodynamics that guarantees security in their 
system but the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem, via the Johnson-Nyquist formula. (We note, 
in passing, that a similar assertion was made in the very first paper on the KLJN scheme [1]; 
this argument was later replaced by one involving the more widely known Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, which is applicable as well).  
 
3. The Random-Resistor (analog) KLJN scheme 
 
Before we turn to our main results, we outline the Random-Resistor (RR-) KLJN scheme in 
Fig. 3. This system is not binary but analog and in thermal equilibrium. The RR-KLJN scheme 
employs random resistors chosen from a quasi-continuum set of resistance values. It has been 
well-known since the inception of the KLJN concept that such a system could work, because 
Alice and Bob can calculate the unknown resistance value from measurements. This fact has 
been addressed for pedagogical reasons in oral conference presentations by the Author (starting 
with the plenary talk at the Fluctuation and Noise Symposium, Florence, in 2007) but it has not 
been mentioned in the corresponding written publications as it was considered impractical.  
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Fig. 3. The Random-Resistor KLJN scheme. The temperature at the two sides is the same and is a pre-defined, 
publicly known constant value; thus the net power flow is zero. The resistors at Alice (A) and Bob (B), and their 
corresponding voltage noise spectra, are continuum random variables with a new random choice made at 
the beginning of each KLJN period. The Low (L) and High (H) bit values at Alice and Bob are determined by 
the relative resistance values; for example, the party with the higher resistance has the high bit. From voltage and 
current measurements, Eve can estimate the two resistance values but not their locations, unless the resistors are 
identical. In the hypothetical but non-practical case when the resistance distribution is a continuum, and when the 
inaccuracies of Alice’s and Bob’s estimations are zero, 100% of the secure bit exchange is accomplished because  
  the probability of choosing two identical resistances is zero. In the practical case with finite accuracy (finite bit 
exchange duration) and a quasi-continuum discrete distribution, the secure bit exchange efficiency is less than 
100%, because some of the bits must be discarded, but it is greater than 50%. 
 
4. The Random-Resistor-Random-Temperature KLJN scheme 
 
The important discovery by VMG [19] ‒ that unconditional perfect security exists at a non-
zero power flow ‒ is the feature that inspired our new Random-Resistor-Random-Temperature 
(RRRT-) KLJN; see Fig. 4 which defines two new parameters, α and β, by RB = αRA and 
TB = βTA. Yet our new scheme is completely different from that of VMG because it uses really 
“arbitrary” (ad hoc) resistances as in the RR-KLJN scheme and, moreover, random (ad hoc) 
temperatures from a continuum interval. Thus the forthcoming resistance and temperature 
values are unknown even by Alice and Bob (analogously with their lack of knowledge about 
the next secure key bit), except for the ranges of values. Consequently, even Kerckhoffs’s 
principle [23] does not allow any information leak about resistance and temperature values, and 
only their continuum range is publicly known. This fact makes all formerly known attack types 
invalid in their original form and, without further development of them, they offer zero 
information gain about Eve’s keys.  
 
4.1. Security proof of the RRRT-KLJN scheme 
 
We analyze the protocol from Alice’s point of view, which obviously is valid for Bob, too.  
− Known to Alice: her own temperature, resistance and noise spectrum, and the wire 
measurements of Su(f), Si(f) and power PAB  flowing to Alice from Bob.  
− Unknown to Alice: α and β.  
− Known to Eve: wire measurements of  Su(f), Si(f)  and PAB. 
− Unknown to Eve: α, β,  TA and RA. 
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Fig. 4. The Random-Resistor-Random-Temperature KLJN scheme. The temperatures and the resistors at Alice 
(A) and Bob (B), and their corresponding voltage noise spectra, are continuum random variables with a new 
random choice made at the beginning of each KLJN period. The Low (L) and High (H) bit values at Alice and Bob 
are determined by the relative resistance values; for example, the party with the higher resistance has the high bit. 
Eve cannot determine the two resistance values, not even their sum, as in the KLJN, VMG-KLJN and RR-KLJN 
cases. In the hypothetical but non-practical situation when the resistance distribution is a continuum and the 
inaccuracies of Alice’s and Bob’s estimation results are zero, 100% of the secure bit exchange is accomplished. 
In the practical case with finite accuracy (finite bit exchange duration) and a quasi-continuum discrete distribution,  
the secure bit exchange efficiency is less than 100%, because the bits with singular noise and power levels must 
be discarded, but 100% can be approached with proper design. 
 
Alice wants to find out Bob’s unknown parameters α and β. She can set up three equations 
by using the principles of linear operations on noise and have: 
 
                    = 4  	
	
+ 
4  ()	
	
=




(
 + ),        (6) 
 
 
                                            = 
 () +



 ()
=



 

()
                                 (7) 
 
and the power flow, according to earlier work [16], is: 
 
                                      = ∆   − 14 = 4∆


,                         (8) 
 
where ∆f is the noise bandwidth. (6) to (8) allow us to define three new quantities, which Alice 
can calculate from her own parameters and the measured data by: 
 
                                                            = ()


=


,                                                    (9) 
 
                                                            = 

∆
=


                                                   (10) 
and 
                                                            = 


=


.                                                   (11) 
 
It can be shown that (9) and (10) lead to a second-order equation for β, which has two 
solutions according to: 
                                 , =
±	


.                   (12) 
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In situations for which one solution is positive and the other is negative, which is unphysical, 
the positive result provides Alice with Bob’s temperature value. When both solutions are 
positive, an alternative second order equation, created from (10) and (11), must be solved; the 
joint solution of that equation with the solution of (12) yields the correct temperature parameter
β  of Bob. Finally, knowing the correct value of β , any one of (9) to (11) yields Bob’s resistance 
parameterα . 
Importantly, Eve cannot determine these values because, for her, there are four unknown 
quantities while she can set up only three equations. Thus she has infinite possibilities, provided 
the continuum system is unbounded, which is impractical. 
In practical applications, the solution of the above equations will not be needed, especially 
when we consider the fact that the RRRT-KLJN system will be a digital one, similarly to the 
case of the KLJN scheme. This means that the temperature and resistance data will form a 
quasi-continuum discrete set with resolution given by the bit resolution of the system. Thus, 
instead of the above calculations, a bottom-up version is feasible and practical as a consequence 
of its reduced calculation need during operation. This approach involves a tabulation of all 
possible temperature and resistor settings at Alice and Bob and creating a look-up table from 
the data on  Su(f), Si(f) and PAB.  
One should note that this kind of tabulation must be done in any case in order to locate 
possible singular combinations of Su(f), Si(f) and PAB that could uniquely inform Eve about the 
resistance and temperature situations. For any secure bit, the measurable set of Su(f), Si(f) and 
PAB must be degenerated and thus must occur for at least two opposite bit situations within the 
statistical inaccuracy of the KLJN operation; otherwise Eve can extract the bit by using her own 
model of the system, which she can build according to the Kerckhoffs’s principle [23]. Those 
singular shared bits are insecure and must be discarded during operation whenever they occur.    
 
4.2. Immunity against former attacks 
 
The RRRT-KLJN scheme has several advantages and makes all existing and previously 
valid attacks invalid in their known form. For example, the key exchange speed is virtually 
doubled because, with proper design, almost all bit exchange periods supply a secure key bit 
due to overlap of the noise and power levels belonging to different bit settings. Resistor- or 
temperature-inaccuracies do not matter, and they can no longer be used for Hao-type attacks 
[22, 26]. The Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv-Kish cable resistance attack [27, 28] is also invalid in its 
known form, just as is the new cable-capacitance attack by Chen et al. [29]. Finally, the new 
transient attack [30] by Gunn-Allison-Abbott does not work either because of the unknown 
resistances and temperatures. 
New attacks are of course possible. For example, if Eve compares the mean-square voltages 
at the two ends of the wire she gets a new equation, and then she probably has enough equations 
to extract information due to the non-zero wire resistance. An information leak will then exist, 
and the real question is: how large is this leak considering Eve’s poor statistics due to the 
strongly limited bit-exchange period; see related analysis elsewhere [3, 7].  
 
4.3. Some practical considerations 
 
A disadvantage of the RRRT-KLJN scheme is that the Kish-Granqvist temperature-
compensation defense mechanism [16] cannot be used to nullify cable resistance effects against 
an as yet unknown attack of such a kind. A perhaps more practical version of the RRRT-KLJN 
scheme is the generalization of the formerly proposed Multiple-KLJN (MKLJN) system [5] 
based on a random choice of a known large set of resistors by introducing a random choice of 
temperatures from a known large set of such data. As already mentioned above, the known sets 
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must be properly checked, because only choices with degenerated voltage/current/power values 
can be considered secure, not the singular values. Bit-error analysis [13, 14] and error removal 
is still an open problem in the RRRT-KLJN scheme.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We introduced two schemes with arbitrary (ad hoc) random resistor choices and enhanced 
communication speed. The RRRT-KLJN scheme also has ad hoc random temperatures, and 
this makes the new scheme unique among the existing KLJN versions because even the sum of 
the resistances is secret. All former attacks are invalid and, as a minimum, need further 
developments to extract any information. 
The RRRT system also has disadvantages, and some advanced features of the enhanced 
KLJN schemes, such as the iKLJN [5], cannot be used, and some of the defense features against 
active (invasive) attacks may need to be upgraded. 
Only the future can tell if the RRRT scheme remains a topic of purely academic interest or 
whether it will lead to important practical applications. Both the generation of a random 
(analog) resistance and a random temperature look technically feasible, especially since 
accuracy and reproducibility of the resistance values are unimportant. There is no reason to use 
the RR-KLJN scheme because the RRRT scheme needs only a minor expansion: controlling 
the mean-square amplitude of the noise voltage generators. 
It is yet an open question if the original KLJN system and its enhanced versions iKLJN, 
KKLJN, VMG, etc., or the new RRRT-KLJN scheme, are more feasible for practical 
applications; all of them offer unconditional (information theoretic) security. 
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